Department of Economics
Working Paper

War and the Fiscal Capacity of the State

By
Abdur R. Chowdhury
Syed Mansoob Murshed

Working Paper 2013-03

College of Business Administration

War and the Fiscal Capacity of the State
Abdur R.Chowdhury
Department of Economics
Marquette University
Syed Mansoob Murshed
International Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, Netherlands
&
Coventry University, Coventry, UK

Abstract.
We examine the role of war in retarding state fiscal capacity in developing countries, measured by
tax revenue ratios to GDP. This in contrast to the European experience from the Renaissance to the
20th century, where it is believed that war and state-building were inseparable, enhancing the fiscal
capacity of the state; in turn enlarging the scope and magnitude of government expenditure. We
build a simple theoretical model of a factionalized state, where patronage substitutes for common
interest public goods, along with the possibility of violent contestation over a rent or prize, typically
in the form of natural resource revenues. Our dynamic panel empirical analysis on the determinants
of fiscal capacity is applied to 79 developing countries, during 1980-2010. Results indicate that war,
especially in its current dominant form of civil war, retards fiscal capacity, along with imperfect
democracy, political repression, the quality of governance, dependence on oil and macroeconomic
mismanagement. High intensity conflict is particularly destructive of state capacity. Countries
experiencing low intensity wars, other institutional factors may matter more for fiscal capacity
formation compared to war. The diminution of state capacity due to war appears less pronounced
after the end of the cold war.
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1. Introduction
One characteristic of developing countries is low fiscal capacity and smaller government
relative to the size of the economy, compared to that of richer developed countries and
emerging economies (Brazil); see Table 1. Low fiscal capabilities constrain state capacity:
the manifold functions of the state in terms of guaranteeing security, social protection,
economic management and the provision of a host of other public goods. It has been argued
by Tilly (1992) that for Europe, historically, state building and war making were
inseparable, leading ultimately to enhanced state capacity amidst widening spheres of
government activity. The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze the relationship
between war, particularly in its dominant form civil war, and the fiscal capacity of the state
for contemporary developing countries.
Table 1: State Capacity in Selected Developed and Developing Countries in 2010
Country
UK
Germany
Brazil
India
Congo, Democratic Rep. of
Ethiopia

Source:

Government Expenditure as a Taxes as a per cent share of
per cent share of GDP
GDP
45.8
35.0
48.8
36.3
40.6
34.4
22.4
17.7
22.9
13.2
21.8
11.6

OECD Tax Statistics 2011; Planning Commission of India; World Bank

The functions of the state are important in maintaining the cohesiveness of society, and
sustaining the social contract between rulers and the ruled, and different factions within
society. Besides a legitimate Weberian monopoly over violence, a functioning state must be
able to enforce laws, property rights and contracts, as well as have the fiscal capacity to
raise revenues and provide public goods (Mill, 1848). A modern state must also be able to
provide a wider range of public goods (health, education for example), in addition to a
capacity to regulate and manage markets. More affluent nations have bigger governments
(as measured by the share of government consumption in national income). Economic
decline in ‘failing’ states severely undermines the state’s fiscal capacity, something which
can make it heavily aid dependent (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008). Aid dependence, in turn,
can further diminish state capacity. Furthermore, a ‘failing’ state’s ability to guarantee
personal security, property rights and laws is often compromised, leading to the gradual
privatisation of violence between predatory and defensive elements within society.
Individuals rely on kinship based groups and local warlords for security and public good
provision; this in turn heightens the risk of civil war as society descends towards an
anarchical, Hobbesian, state of nature. In the contemporary developing world the lack of
1

fiscal/state capacity enhances civil war risk; civil war in turn further attenuates fiscal
capacity by destroying pre-existing fiscal institutions that used to garner revenues for the
state. Thus, the lack of state capacity increases the risk of civil war.
State capacity is essential for sustained growth with equity, which is the major
challenge for developing countries. The size of government and growth may sometimes be
negatively correlated, but the state has minimum functions associated with security, law
enforcement, securing property rights and the enforcement of contracts. Human capital
formation is also central to newer growth theories, and much of this education is usually
publicly provided. All of this requires that the state is able to command resources for its
activities, and public goods provision; richer countries tend to have bigger government
measured by the share of government consumption in national income.
Curiously, war may have facilitated the development of state capacity in Europe
since the 15th century (Tilly, 1992). The development of the modern European state was
closely linked to external war: war made the state and the state made war. A prominent
feudal oligarch might establish a monopoly of violence within a society previously
characterized by competition amongst competing warlords. The coercive activity of statemaking (removing rivals and challengers to the sovereign’s power) was complemented by
other wars against external enemies, as well as protecting the interests of his support
group. These activities require resources, initially funded by the means directly at the
ruler’s disposal or tributes exacted from the population, particularly in conquered regions.
Gradually, as war became more and more complex, requiring larger forces which
had to be maintained for longer periods, other sources of finance (newer taxes or
borrowing from merchant capitalists) had to be explored and invented. The path chosen
could be more coercive in countries more dependent on agriculture (Tsarist Russia), or
more capital intensive in states engaged in more merchant capital based activities (the
Dutch Republic), or a mixture of the two. It should be noted that a reliance on land and
agricultural taxes require a more elaborate bureaucratic machinery such as in Prussia,
compared to the dependence on trade and other indirect taxes (the 17th century Dutch
republic). Be that as it may, it compelled the successful ruler to enter in to bargains with
wider sections of the population (landlords and/or merchants). A wider administrative
structure unfolded, leading to the gradual development of laws, fiscal institutions,
accounting systems, academies and schools to train state functionaries. The sovereign had
to invest in state, especially fiscal, capacity so as to be able to levy taxes and oversee their
smooth collection. Some wars advance the economic interests of the sovereign’s richer
subjects, such as during mercantilist wars of the 17th to 19th century. This will prompt the
political support of the merchant and nascent capitalist classes, and they will not object to
2

the sovereign’s gathering revenues for further and more efficient war making against their
common (economic) foes, provided he respects their property rights and develops legal
frameworks facilitating contractual capital formation.
Further down history, as the scale of war increased requiring more specialized
equipment and larger standing armies, more revenues and administrative capacity became
necessary. Tilly (1992), for example, points out fiscal innovations like the income tax in
Britain during the Napoleonic wars in 1799, and the rise in share of government revenues
to GDP from 15-24% in the same country during that period did much to lay the
foundations of future British state capacity. Increased taxation and conscription compelled
rulers to make concessions to wider sections of the population. This meant more
representative government, and augmentation of state activities towards regulating
production, manipulating distribution, providing social protection; in short more and more
public goods, until we arrive at a point where military expenditure, even if increasing in
absolute terms, becomes a smaller segment of total government expenditure. Monopolized
trade related rents lead to the accumulation of capital, followed by economic growth, even
industrialization in some cases. Industrialization and modern economic growth, however,
require technical progress, which reduces the dependence on a war making state, as it is
competitiveness and not exclusive trading rights that drives profit, a process, which is
aided by free trade and domestic public goods that enhance factor productivity.
In a nutshell, war leads to the development of state capacity, primitive accumulation
and in some cases metamorphoses into modern manufactures based economic growth led
by technical progress. A history of making war against a nation’s common external enemies
may lay the foundations for future state capacity, and assist nation building, as it lays the
basis for fiscal and legal institutions. This process, however, may not apply to internal
conflict, which often undermines institutions, and interest in the provision of public goods.
Does this narrative, if valid, have any relevance for developing countries at present?
Most developing countries commenced their post-colonial existence with reasonable
institutions and state capacity. The last quarter of the 20th century, however, witnessed
growth and development failure in many parts of the developing world (especially in
Africa). This phenomenon is also referred to as state failure, particularly in the discourse of
strategic and international studies. Associated with these developments, state capacity has
declined in many countries, and several of these nations have also experienced civil war,
which is widely believed to attenuate state capacity even further. Other developing
countries (including those not experiencing civil war) are characterized by factional
politics, with governments, even democratically elected ones, serving particular group
interests. These states have little interest in providing common interest public goods to its
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entire citizenry, but instead will concentrate on using the state’s resources to reward their
own faction via political patronage. Patronage substitutes for wide ranging public goods.
Thus, state capacity as measured by government expenditure as a proportion of national
income may be low, but tax revenues as a share of national income will certainly be smaller
in factionalized states where patronage is widespread; the state may rely on overseas aid
and its ability to directly command resources, royalties and rents.
In a series of papers Besley and Persson (2008, 2010) have developed models of the
endogenous investment by present-day rulers in state and legal capacity for future use by
society. Legal capacity is similar to the good economic institutions essential for economic
growth in long-run in the spirit of the currently fashionable arguments disseminated by
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005). The development of legal capacity enhances
growth, which in turn increases the revenue base of the state. Fiscal capacity formation in
particular, is a costly investment and the returns are in the future. In a factionalized society
state capacity to finance a public good in the future depends on whether the revenues are
put to uses (public goods) that enhance the utility of all members of society, not just the
incumbent group in power. The purest form of a common interest public good is national
security expenditure directed against external threats, and Besley and Persson (2008,
2010) do not consider other public goods such as education, health and infrastructure. In a
society where there are no national (common) interest public goods a factionalized society
emerges; the state taxes everyone but uses the revenues to make transfers only to its own
followers (who in effect pay negative taxes). The state’s incentives to invest in state
capacity are further attenuated by political instability, possible violent challenges to the
state via civil war (which eliminates the need for common interest public goods provision),
and an economy where a large share of national income emanates from natural resource
rents (that do not require the production relations of manufacturing or agriculture). Besley
and Persson (2010) conduct some preliminary empirical investigation of their propositions
and find support for their assertions, but much more systematic analysis is required using
time series econometric techniques to address the reverse causality between war,
especially civil war and fiscal institutions, and to account for unobserved heterogeneity
between countries. This is what we do in our paper.
The next section presents a simple theoretical model explaining the absence of
common interest public goods in factionalised societies that may lead to outright civil war.
Section 3 discusses our econometric modeling strategy for analyzing the effect of war on
state fiscal capacity, including dynamic panel data and country fixed effects techniques.
Section 4 presents our results, and Section 5 discusses sensitivity tests. The long run
multipliers are presented in Section 6 while additional robustness tests are reported in
Section 7. The final section concludes the paper.
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2 Theory
Our theoretical model is meant to motivate the empirical work that follows on the
determinants of the state’s fiscal capacity. In this section, however, we will refer to state
capacity more generally. Following Besley and Persson (2008, 2010) we have two groups
in society (S): a politically incumbent group another faction in opposition, denoted by a
subscripts I and O respectively. We will examine three degrees of political factionalism
indicated by common interest public goods, another situation where each group benefits
from a specific club good provided by the state, and a scenario of outright civil war (or
equivalently a repressive state) when both groups fight over a prize or rent, and there are
no common interest public goods across political factions. We reduce our theoretical
analysis into a one period decision making process that has implications, both for the
present and future, as present investment in state capacity enhances both current and
future income, unless there is internal war.
To begin with the first (common interest scenario), the utility (UI) of the group in power
is1:
UI = GS + [1-tI](GS)YI(GS)+ φR

(1)

For the opposition:
UO = GS + [1-tO](GS)YO(GS)+ [1 – φ]R

(2)

GS refers to the provision of common national interest public goods across both factions of
society. It directly enhances the utility of both social groups equally, and is non-excludable
and non-rivaled, also enhancing the productivity of national output. In other words, it is not
solely military expenditure directed for defense against a common external enemy as in
Besley and Persson (2008, 2010), but includes social sector expenditures such as on
infrastructure, health and education which enhance productivity in the economy and
promote growth.2
The parameter t, refers to the tax rate imposed on income, Y to finance the public
good to group I in equation (1) and for group O in equation (2). Hence, [1 –t]Y represents
disposable income. The ability to raise revenues rises with the provision of the common
1 We assume that each group has resolved the collective action problem, and participation and incentive
compatibility constraints of group members have been met.
2 GS can be composed of social sector spending, Ss and military (security) spending MS. An increase in military
spending can therefore crowd out social sector spending out of a given budget.
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interest public good, which in turn enhances the state’s fiscal capacity. A high value of GS
may also be indicative of better quality institutions, as state (fiscal) capacity is greater.
The last term R refers to a rent, which is shared according to some partisan rule.
Rents can be composed of natural resource revenues, fungible foreign aid or a purely
political rent extractable when in office.3 A fraction φ accrues to the incumbent group in
equation (1), and a proportion 1- φ is the share of the opposition in (2). Alternatively, φ
can be viewed as the probability of remaining in power in the next period for the
incumbent, and 1 – φ the probability that the opposition gets into power in the next period;
enlightened self-interest (a rule that does not produce latent or open conflict) dictates that
these correspond to the group’s population share. Sometimes, an enlightened dictator can
choose shares (φ and 1 – φ) according to some rule that reflects population size and
political weight, effectively employing inclusiveness to avoid having to either fight or
repress the opposition.
Observe that we are stating that the rent (whether natural resource, patronage or
foreign aid based) does not enhance state capacity even if it is used for public good
provision rather than private distribution. This is in line with the arguments of Ghani and
Lockhart (2008) that foreign aid does not add to state capacity, but can be an alternative
(foreign) source of public good provision, as well as Ross’ (2001) assertion that when
resource rents finance public goods, obviating from the need to tax, this retards the
accountability of the state and democratic development (no taxation, no representation). In
equations (1) and (2) the rent, R enters into utility in an additive, separable fashion, so that
increases in both Y and R enhance utility. However, to maintain constant utility in the face
of a decline in R, there has to be an increase in Y, which requires state capacity. By the same
token, countries experiencing resource booms may have less incentive to enhance state
capacity, if their reliance on produced income, Y, diminishes, thus experiencing classic
‘Dutch’ disease effects both in their macroeconomy and in the political economy sphere.
Maximising utilities in (1) and (2) with respect to GS and setting we obtain:
1 + [1-tI]YIG = tIGYI

(3)

And
1 + [1-to]YOG = tOG YO

(4)

3 In the case of natural resource royalties we are referring to rent: that is the revenue available after extraction
costs.
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In (3) and (4) the marginal benefits of the common interest public good are on the left hand
side, and the right-hand sides correspond to marginal costs. An additional subscript, such
as G, refers to a partial derivative with respect to that variable. In this common national
interest equilibrium the state will equalize tax rates for both groups (tI = tO), and both
groups will accept this voluntarily as it enhances individual, group and national income.
This is also the utilitarian (greatest good of the greatest number) outcome.
What if there is a degree of polarization and factionalism between the two groups?
In this case we may choose to rewrite the utility functions (1) and (2) as:
UI = αGI + [1-tI](GI)YI(GI)+ R

(5)

UO = [1 –α]GO + [1-tO](GO)YO(GO)

(6)

Where GS = αGI +[1 –α]GO
In this case, the common interest public good becomes akin to a group specific club
good (Cornes and Sandler, 1996). These are non-rivalled, and each member of the club (or
group) can enjoy the good, but somehow it is excludable for the outside group. This
happens in states that are multi-ethnic with different languages, religions, histories of
division and vastly competing economic endowments. Here the state collects the revenues
for the public good and apportions a fraction α to its own group and a proportion 1 – α to
the opposition. One may assume that the more factional the state, α increases, and in the
limit as α→1, we have a completely partisan state that taxes the opposition but gives it no
benefit, instead appropriating all the revenues for its own group. Only the politically
incumbent group enjoys the rent, R, and no thought is given to the future consequences of
excluding the opposition. Maximisation of (5) and (6) with respect to GI and GO yields:
α + [1-tI]YIG = tIGYI

(7)

And
1 -α + [1-to]YOG = tOGYO

(8)

When we compare (7) and (8) with (3) and (4) this situation may not produce less
provision of the public goods, but may engender demands for greater autonomy (if α is
more than proportional to population share of the incumbent), and calls for fiscal
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federalism in terms of setting tax rates and deciding on public expenditure priorities. Here,
tI,GI and tO,G) are not necessarily equal.
Finally, we have the possibility of outright repression by the incumbent of the
opposition, and civil war. In this case, φ = 1, with no national provision of public goods to
the opposition. Also, there is no direct utility from public goods, although indirectly it
enhances utility for the governing faction by increasing the productivity of private goods.
The utilities of the two groups become:
UI = [1-tI(GI, FI)]YI(GI, FI)+ ψ(FI)R

(9)

UO = [1-tO]YO(FO) + [1- ψ](FO)R

(10)

Here both sides violently contest the rent R, utilizing a fighting effort F; ψ and 1- ψ are the
probabilities of success in this civil war for the government and rebels (opposition)
corresponding to a Tullock (1967) type contest success function.4 We also, postulate that
civil war has a negative influence on income for both sides, because of the negative effect
on existing institutions, damage to infrastructure and the endowments of each group. For
the government (or incumbent) side there is still a group specific public good (besides its
fighting expenditure against the rebels) that enhances income of the group, but its total
taxes now have to finance fighting the opposition also:
GI = tIYI - FI

(11)

There are fewer resources available to enhance growth and productivity. The opposition
group has an endowment, YO from which a proportion tO is taxed to finance their war effort,
and there are no group specific public goods that enhance productivity for the opposition.
Maximizing (9) and (10) with respect to FI and FO:
ΨFI R + [1-tI]YIFI= tFIYI

(12)

[1-ψ]FO R + [1-tO]YOFO = tFOYO

(13)

4 The probability of success depends on own military effort compared to total military effort by both sides scaled
upwards or downwards by a military decisiveness parameter.
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Where the left hand sides represent the marginal benefit of fighting (gaining the rent or
prize) and the right hand side its marginal cost. Observe, that the second term on the lefthand side is negative, civil war adversely impacts on income by undermining institutions,
and because of collateral damage to endowments. Clearly, the incentive to fight the other
faction rises with the value of the resource rents (R) available for capture by either group
relative to the income loss due to civil war. Hence, civil war will be less likely the greater
the share of produced income (Y).
Maximizing (11) with respect to GI yields:
[1-tI]YIG = tIGYI
(14)
The marginal benefit of the public good (YIG) will be smaller than before (utilizing (11)),
and the marginal cost (tIG) will be greater again from (11). Some revenues have to be
diverted to fighting internal rivals, something that does not increase state capacity or the
productivity of produced income. Thus, in the state of civil war there is diminished
investment in state capacity, even when compared to the non-violent factional outcomes in
(7) and (8), and none for the opposition; a large share of revenues are used to fight a
domestic foe. Furthermore, during civil war existing state capacity and institutions may
also be undermined. Thus, there is a two-way (reverse) causality that may be operational
during civil war; it creates lesser incentives for investment in state capacity; the state
capacity that does exist may atrophy and decay.
In a purely repressive equilibrium, where the opposition is unable to mount a
challenge against the ruling faction, ψ = 1, and the government uses part of its resources
(FI) to suppress an opposition group that is unable to fight back; R is not contestable
between the two parties, and of course the incumbent power (state) does not share rents
or public goods with rival groups.

3. Methodology and Variables
Given the theoretical underpinnings discussed in the previous section for the lack of
common interest public goods, our objective is to empirically analyze the effect of war,
especially civil war, on the fiscal capacity of the state in the contemporary developing
world (between 1980 and 2010), specifically the effect of war (our data sources for conflict
are described in detail in the appendix) on the tax-GDP ratio. We do not look at government
expenditure, because total state spending may be financed not only by taxation and
borrowing, but also direct access to rents, royalties, state trading monopolies and foreign
aid (as indicated for Ethiopia and the Congo in Table 1). The state may also rely on inflation
taxes, and manipulate the exchange rate to capture more resources for itself (we proxy this
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via a dual exchange rate variable). We will proxy the nature of the state through
governance and political variables. A poorly governed state, with weak institutions will
have less fiscal capacity. It is particularly difficult to find data on the quality of governance
prior to the late 1990s, with the exception of the economic freedom index described in the
appendix. As far as the political nature of the state is concerned we use the Polity scale,
which ranges from -10 for a perfect autocracy to 10 for a mature well functioning
democracy. There are possibilities in between, most developing countries fall into a
category called anocracy (with Polity scores between -4 to 6—which means it has
characteristics of both democracy (elections) and autocracy (unconstrained executives).
More democratic states are more accountable and have more common interest public
goods, meaning that their fiscal base is likely to be larger. We also use the political
repression index (see appendix), more repressive states may have narrower tax bases for
the theoretical reasons outlined above. We also postulate that Presidential (as opposed to
Prime Ministerial) systems are more authoritarian, as challenges (impeachment) is more
difficult in these instances; most developing countries are Presidential. We also include an
oil exporter effect, the impact of ethnic fractionalisation and aid as independent variables.
These are likely to reduce domestic resource mobilization. We utilize the size of the
economy (GDP), and per-capita GDP as control variables.
An important complication in empirically studying the impact of conflict on state
capacity is the potential for endogeneity biases as a result of measurement error, reverse
causation, and omitted variables. Reverse causality is a concern when examining the link
between state capacity and conflict, since greater fiscal capacity might lead to lower
conflicts either because higher tax revenue reduces some of the causes of internal conflicts,
or because it leads to more income inequality which fuels more discontent and conflict.
Moreover, omitted factors can explain both the evolution of conflict and of fiscal capacity,
also leading to biases in the estimated impact of conflict on fiscal capacity.
We try to address these concerns by using several different estimators. First, we
conduct estimations including country and time fixed effects to account for unobserved
country characteristics and for common shocks and trends across countries. In order to
address biases due to reverse causality, we run regressions lagging all regressors one
period and we conduct dynamic system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
estimations à la Arellano and Bover (1995), using lagged regressors as instruments. Finally,
we perform instrumental variables (IV) estimations to try to address, in a more direct
manner, the potential endogeneity of conflicts arising from measurement error, omitted
factors, and/or reverse causation. We use two sets of instruments based on characteristics
of the sample countries: (a) measures of economic conditions in sample countries and (b)
10

variables that capture the views held, and the policies pursued by policy-makers with
respect to conflicts.
We empirically examine the link between state capacity and conflict by estimating a
number of variants of Eq. (15)
TAXit = α0 + α1Cit + β’Xit + δ’Dt + µit

(15)

where i refers to the country and t refers to the time period included in the study. TAX is
the ratio of tax revenue to GDP and measures state capacity. A complete list of countries
and years is given in the Appendix Table 1. Appendix Table 2 provides definitions and
sources for each of the variables in our estimations.
The matrix X in Eq. (15) refers to a set of variables that the literature has found to be
related to fiscal capacity. In all estimations we control for the size of the economy, defined
as the log of GDP in constant US dollars, and the level of economic development, as
measured by per capita GDP. These variables are included on the grounds that fiscal sector
development entails fixed costs that become less important the larger the size of the
economy and the richer the country. Also, GDP per capita can proxy for the quality of legal
institutions in the country, which have been shown to have a positive impact on revenue
collection. In all models, we also control for inflation, measured as the annual percentage
change in the GDP deflator.
Current and capital account openness have also been found to have a positive effect
on government revenue. Following Gupta et al (2009), we include two variables to control
for the degree of capital and current account openness. First, we include a dummy for the
presence of dual exchange rate regimes — a measure of capital account restrictions.
Second, the ratio of imports and exports to GDP proxies for current account openness.
Finally, the EFI variable represents the economic freedom index.
We first examine the link between state capacity and conflict by running estimations
with country and time fixed effects to control for unobserved country characteristics and
for common shocks and trends across countries. These estimations should help lessen
concerns about endogeneity due to relevant omitted factors. Also, to reduce concerns about
reverse causality we lag all regressors in our estimations.
To address the potential bias due to reverse causality, we conduct estimations using
two lagged values of the regressors as instruments in a GMM dynamic framework à la
11

Arellano and Bover (1995). In particular, Eqs. (16) and (17) , are estimated as part of the
dynamic system GMM estimates
TAXit = α0 + σTAXi,t-1 + α1Cit + β’Xit + δ’Dt + µit

(16)

TAXit - TAXi,t-1 = α0 + σ(TAXi,t-1 - TAXi,t-2) + α1Cit + β’(Xit - Xi,t-1) + δ’Dt + (µit - µi,t-1)

(17)

In Eqs. (16) and (17), the use of instruments is required to deal with the likely
endogeneity of the explanatory variables and with the fact that in both equations the error
term is correlated with the lagged dependent variable.
While using lagged values of the regressors as instruments can help deal with the
problem of reverse causality, it does not address biases arising due to measurement error,
since lagged values of the regressors are likely to suffer from this problem as well.
Therefore, we also estimate Instrumental Variables (IV) estimations where we use external
as opposed to internal instruments. In particular, we use two-period lagged economic
conditions such as GDP per capita and inflation. Given space constraints, these results are
not presented here but are available from the authors upon request.

4. Estimation Results
We now proceed to test our model on a sample of 79 countries. The choice of countries is
strictly determined by the availability of consistent data on all the variables. We consider five
types of variables in the estimation process: the fiscal variable, conflict variable, control
variables, governance indicators, and other explanatory variables. The analysis uses a panel
data set with data averaged over 5-year periods from 1980 to 2010. The averaging of the data
helps to reduce the possibility of short-run cyclical movements affecting the results.
The CONFLICT variable refers to the use of armed force between two parties, of which
at least one is the government of a state, resulting in at least 25 battle-related deaths. Fifty-one
countries in the sample are categorized as conflict countries. Depending on the intensity of the
conflict, we allow for three conflict categories: Low, Medium, and High corresponding to the
alpha-numeric ranking 1, 2, and 3, respectively. From our sample, 29 per cent of countries are
high conflict nations, 22 per cent medium conflict, and 14 per cent low conflict countries. The
remaining 35 per cent of the sample include countries with no conflict. These countries are
assigned a rank of zero.
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A number of control variables are used in the models. The rationale for using per
capita GDP as one of the control variables is straightforward: richer nations tend to have
better scores in governance indicators, and to have more solid and mature fiscal institutions.
The indicators of economic freedom capture the likely impact of governance in the
context of risk and prudential regulation prevailing in that country. They not only show how
governments are elected, monitored and replaced, but also their capacity to formulate and
implement public policies effectively as well as the attitude of the electorate and their
representatives toward the institutions that govern economic, political, and social
interactions.
Thirty three countries in the sample are from Africa. An African dummy variable is
therefore used to capture adverse geographical, neighborhood, and conflict effects. First, to
set the stage, the 51 conflict-prone countries in the sample are ranked by the intensity of
the CONFLICT variable. State capacity, TAX, is inversely related to CONFLICT across the
three groups shown in Table 2. The asterisk next to the average TAX variable in the
countries with low intensity conflict, 0.257, indicates that this ratio is significantly larger
than in the countries with medium conflict intensity (at the 0.05 level in a one-tailed,
homoskedastic t-test, i.e., assuming equal variance), as indicated by the t-statistic within
parentheses below. The critical t-value is 1.66. Likewise, the average TAX variable for the
middle conflict intensity group, 0.142, is significantly larger than in the high conflict
intensity countries. The F-value in the bottom line, 10.58, also exceeds the critical value,
2.89, indicating significant differences among the three average values of TAX reported (at
the 0.05 level). Thus countries with high conflict intensity tend to be associated with lower
average values for state capacity, TAX. In fact, the figure for high conflict economies is
nearly a quarter of that for low conflict countries, indicating a significantly lower tax
receipts as a proportion of GDP in high conflict countries.
The regression results are presented in Table 3. Each regression equation uses a
balanced data set using various years from the sample 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005
and 2010. The point estimate and the absolute values of the corresponding t-statistics are
reported. The results reported in Column (1) in Table 3 is for a baseline specification, over
an extended sample period, that does not control for fixed effects and does not take
persistence into account. The estimates show a negative relationship between conflict and
tax revenue but it is significant only at the 10 percent level. The signs of the coefficients of
the other control variables, except per capita GDP, are statistically significant and have the
expected signs.
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However, these results should be treated with caution as they may be driven by the
omission of initial conditions. These conditions are potential determinants of both
contemporaneous fiscal capacity and the probability that a country initially entered a
conflict. To address the limitations of OLS regressions, we estimate the effect of conflicts on
fiscal capacity in a specification that takes into account country fixed effects and the
potential of persistence over time. In particular, we use a dynamic panel data model, which
allows us to capture the effect of past fiscal capacity and country fixed effects on current
fiscal capacity, while addressing endogeneity problems. This approach also implies that we
focus on relatively short run effects of conflicts on a country’s fiscal capacity, as only
within-country variability is taken advantage of.
Column 2 reports results for the fixed effects specification. To lessen concerns about
endogeneity, we have lagged all appropriate regressors by one period. Turning first to
variables other than those related to conflict, the pattern of coefficients is broadly as
expected. The results are much better than those reported for OLS regressions in Column
(1). All the coefficients are statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level. The results
confirm that fiscal capacity is positively correlated with a country’s size and level of
income, but negatively associated with inflation and the adoption of multiple exchange rate
regimes.
By introducing country fixed effects and the lag of the dependent variable in the
model, Column (2) takes into account the possible effects of initial conditions, a country’s
level of development, other sources of unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity, and
persistence in state capacity. At the same time, the specification is subject to the problems
of endogeneity for the lagged dependent variable that are standard in dynamic panel data
models (e.g. Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998). Also, both fiscal capacity
and the probability of facing conflicts may be affected by third shocks that are unobserved
by us (e.g. political reform). This would introduce additional endogeneity problems,
directly related to our variables of interest. Reverse causality is also possible, since current
fiscal capacity may affect the probability that a conflict involving the state occurs.
We address these problems by implementing a one-step ― dynamic System GMM
estimation (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). We consider fiscal
variables as a predetermined regressor in our model, and the conflict measure as an
endogenous variables, given the possibility of both reverse causality and simultaneity bias.
Our instrument for the lagged dependent variable is its own first lag, while we instrument
all other endogenous variables with their own second lags in the differenced equation. The
results we report correspond to a specification where, say, GDP is considered exogenous,
but the effect of conflict on fiscal capacity is not changed if inflation is considered as an
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endogenous variable; however, in the latter case instrument proliferation impedes an
appropriate evaluation of the join exogeneity of instruments. It should be noted, in any
case, that the causality from fiscal capacity to GDP should materialize mainly in the long
run; given that we control for country fixed effects, and thus focus on within country
variability, declaring GDP as exogenous in the present setting is not implausible (Cardenas
et al 2010).
It is worth mentioning that the System GMM estimator requires that the first
differenced instruments used for the variables in levels be uncorrelated with the
unobserved country effects. We make this assumption in all our estimations. That is, we
assume that the first differences of both our lagged values of fiscal capacity and
contemporaneous values of conflict are uncorrelated with any country-specific
characteristics. While the levels of conflict and fiscal capacity must be correlated with
country fixed effects, it seems plausible to assume that changes in these dimensions do not
reflect fixed characteristics of countries.
The estimates of the system GMM are, in principle, fully consistent. The diagnostics
are satisfactory: the Arelano and Bond (1991) tests for first and second order serial
correlation in the differenced equation suggest that, consistent with the underlying
assumptions, the former is present but the latter is not; and the Hansen statistics seems
tolerable. Strikingly, conflict now emerges as both substantially larger and more significant.
For the GMM estimates, the Table reports serial correlation tests, a Sargan test, and
a Difference Sargan test. The serial correlation tests are used to examine the null
hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation and no second-order serial correlation,
respectively, in residuals in first-differences. Given the errors in level being serially
uncorrelated, we would expect to find significant first-order serial correlation, but no
significant second-order correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The Sargan test of
over-identifying restrictions is used to examine the overall validity of the instruments by
comparing the sample moment conditions with their population analog. The Difference
Sargan Test, proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) , is used to test the null hypothesis that
the lagged differences of the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the errors in the
levels equations.
The GMM estimate provides strong evidence that the reduction in conflict is
associated with increased tax receipts of the government, and the diagnostic tests,
including the first-order and second-order serial correlation tests, Sargan test, and the
Difference Sargan test, are supportive. In general, the coefficients on the GDP growth, percapita GDP, and EFI are positively signed, while the coefficients on inflation, multiple
15

exchange rate regime, trade are negatively signed. The interaction term of Africa and
conflict is also negative.
5. Sensitivity and Robustness
The robustness tests include the following dimensions: the use of spline regressions, and
the reduction of the instruments set.
Spline regression: By using spline regressions, the paper further analyzes nonlinearities
with respect to the tax revenue and conflict. A spline specification with two breaks allows
for the effect of tax revenue to be different at low, medium, and high levels of tax revenue
and for low, medium, and high levels of economic freedom (see Cordella et al., 2009). The
results confirm the absence of nonlinearities with respect to the tax revenue.
Instruments set: The robustness of the initial results are also checked using different lags of
the instruments for the lagged dependent variable as well as other endogenous variables in
the differenced equation. There are no qualitative changes in the result thus confirming the
robustness of the findings.
6. Long run impact multipliers
In order to analyze the effect of a change in each explanatory variable on TAX, the
comparative statics method described in Chowdhury (2001) is utilized to calculate long run
impact multipliers. These multipliers measure the change in endogenous variables in the
long run given a unit change in the explanatory variable and are reported in Table 4. Table
5 summarizes the ranking of the variables considered so far. The values suggest that in our
sample countries conflict, economic freedom indicator, and GDP have a significant adverse
effect on fiscal depth.
The presence of CONFLICT is found to be extremely costly in terms of a long-run
reduction in fiscal capacity. The presence of high intensity conflict is, for example,
responsible for a long-run reduction in state capacity, as measured by the tax/GDP ratio of
1.12 per cent. The corresponding reduction in countries with medium and low intensity
conflict are 1.04 and 0.91 per cent, respectively. More interestingly, a reduction in the
intensity of conflict from high to medium would lead to a 7.7 per cent drop in the reduction
in tax receipts due to conflict. A similar shift from a medium to low intensity conflict would
lead to a 14.3 per cent drop in the reduction in tax receipts caused by conflict. Hence any
policy measures that would reduce the intensity of conflict would go a long way to
enhancing the revenue capability in the developing countries.
Among the variables considered, the presence of conflict, in the countries with high
intensity conflict, has the highest long-run adverse effect on state capacity. In high intensity
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conflict countries, economic freedom indicators and inflation follow conflict in their
adverse effect on state capacity. A worsening of the economic freedom indicators reduces
state capacity by 1.04 per cent while a similar worsening in the inflation rate leads to a 0.88
per cent reduction.
Interesting results are found in the medium and low conflict intensity countries. The
CONFLICT variable is no longer the largest contributor to the long-run adverse impact on
state capacity. In both groups of countries, the CONFLICT variable follows EFI and GDP in
its effect on the state capacity. The net impact on tax receipts of each of these variables are
smaller in magnitude than the results for the high conflict intensity countries. This
confirms our previous findings that the more intense the conflict, the higher will be the
magnitude of the adverse effect that other variables have on state capacity.
Overall, the value of the multipliers from the countries with no conflict (last column in
Table 4) are smaller in magnitude than those from the conflict-prone countries. EFI, GDP
and Inflation have the highest long-run adverse effects on depth. The EFI variable leads the
list with a value of 21.84 per cent and is followed by the GDP at 1.25 per cent.
7. Additional Estimation
We have also run a number of GMM systems with various permutation of the variables. In
Tables 6 and 7, we report some of the results. The other regressions (not reported) support
the general conclusions shown in Tables 6 and 7.
POLITY variable - Alternative Measures of Democracy: To test the robustness of our
results to different measures of political democracy across different estimation techniques,
we replaced the Fraser Institute’s EFI variable in regressions from Table 3 with two
different alternatives, and reran these specifications using several different panel-data
estimation methods. The first is the Polity index, which ranges from -10 (full autocracy) to
+10 (full democracy). The second is a measure of democracy taken from Isham et al
(1997)using a composite of indicators of the effectiveness of the legislature vis-a-vis the
executive, the competitiveness of the political nominating process, and freedom of group
opposition (each of which are scored from one to three). The Polity and Banks measures
are both rescaled to yield indicators that range from zero to one. We reran regressions in
Table 3 using a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. All results are
consistent with our previous findings.
Table 6 starts with the base system GMM equation in column 1. This is the same equation
from Table 3 from the paper and used for comparison purposes only. In Column 2, we have
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re-estimated the GMM equation replacing the EFI variable with the POLITY variable. The
Polity variable is positive and statistically significant showing that democracy leads to
higher tax capacity. All other variables retain their signs and statistical significance. Conflict
has a statistically significant and negative impact on tax capacity (Tax revenue/GDP ratio).
Political Repression variable - This represents the political terror scale. We replaced the
conflict variable with the Political Repression variable (1-5 scale with higher numbers
reflecting more terror/repression). The results are very promising. We have run a number
of GMM estimations using the political repression variable and its impact on state capacity.
The results consistently show that higher political repression reduces tax revenue and
state capacity. In column 3 of Table 6, the results are given. Political repression has a
negative and statistically significant impact on state capacity as measured by Tax
revenue/GDP ratio. Other variables are significant and have the expected signs. When we
replaced the EFI with Polity and ran the same estimation (results not reported here), the
results didn't change qualitatively.
President Dummy - In Table 7, we re-estimated the GMM system with President dummy.
Countries with presidential system set to 1 and countries with parliamentary system set to
0. However, the results showed that the president dummy variable was negative but
statistically insignificant. We tried a number of different permutations of the model but the
presidential dummy variable was never significant.
Cold War: The end of the Cold War, marked by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991,
had a dramatic effect on the general level of armed conflict in the global system. The levels
of both interstate and societal warfare declined dramatically through the 1990s and this
trend continues in the early 2000s, falling over 60% from their peak levels. In order to
statistically test this impact, we have re-run the GMM estimates for two sample periods –
Cold War 1980-1990 (reported in Table 8) and post-Cold War 1995-2010 (Table 9). We
have used EFI or POLITY; and CONFLICT or Political Repression as independent variables.
Different combinations of variables were tried. The GMM results didn’t change much.
However, interesting results occurs when we calculate the long run multipliers – the
various intensity of conflict are more significant and have greater impact on tax
revenue/GDP during the Cold War period than in post-Cold War period. Conflict has lost
some of its adverse impact on state capacity after the cold war ended. The introduction of
the Presidential Dummy variable still doesn’t make the variable statistically significant in
either the Cold War or post-Cold War period.
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Inter versus intra-state conflict: Next we divide the conflict variable into inter and intrastate (civil war) conflict. The results (reported in Table 10) are much stronger for the intrastate conflict variable. Conflict has a greater negative impact on state’s fiscal capacity under
civil war than with inter-state conflict as measured by the tax/GDP ratio. The introduction
of the Polity and Political Repression variables in Table 10 (not reported here) do not
qualitatively change the overall results. War may no longer contribute to state building, but
ultimately Charles Tilly may have rightly discerned that state building remains a quasicriminal activity; a process which may not require the development of fiscal capacity as
long as other avenues of coercing resources remain open to those who govern.
Ethnicity: We now see the impact of ethnicity on the state’s fiscal capacity by including an
index of ethno-linguistic fragmentation. Ethnic fragmentation may have an independent
negative impact on tax capacity besides being a cause of civil war. Therefore, we look at its
independent effect, as well as interacting the variable with Conflict. This is because we have
civil war as an independent variable, and the information contained in civil war already
contains information on ethnic division as a cause of war.
The Fractionalization dataset was compiled by Alberto Alesina and associates, and
measures the degree of ethnic, linguistic and religious heterogeneity in various countries.
In other words, it measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a
country are from different ethno-linguistic groups. The dataset was used in Alesina et al.
(2003) to test the effects of fractionalization on the quality of institutions and economic
growth. This measure of ethnic fragmentation takes into account not only language but
also racial characteristics (ethnicity) and religion. The indices are computed as one minus
the Herfindahl index of group shares. Data on the ethnicity indices are taken from the
Macro Data Guide website.
The results are shown in Table 11. The base GMM equation from Tables 3 and 7 is
reproduced in column 1. The impact of ethnicity as well as the interaction of ethnicity and
conflict variable are shown in column 2 in Table 11. The results show that the Ethnicity
variable is statistically insignificant. The interaction term, though positive, is also
statistically insignificant. In column 3, the ethnicity equation is re-estimated after dropping
both the conflict and the ethnicity/conflict interaction variable. Now the ethnicity variable
turns out to be negative and statistically significant.

Oil and Gas Exporter Dummy: We now add an oil and gas exporter dummy to the base
model. This dummy is also taken independently as well as interacted with the Conflict
variable. The conflict variable is dropped from the two estimated equations reported in
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column 4 and 5 in Table 11. The Oil/Gas Dummy has a statistically significant negative
impact. The interaction terms is also negative and statistically significant. Oil exporting
countries appear to depend less on domestic resource mobilization. When the equation is
re-estimated by dropping both the Conflict and the interaction of the Dummy and Conflict
variable, the Oil/Gas Dummy variable gains in both magnitude and significance.
Foreign Aid: Finally, the base equation is re-estimated by adding a Foreign Aid variable.
Data on Foreign Aid is taken from the OECD/DAC database. The resulting estimates are
given in Table 12. The Foreign Aid variable is negative and statistically significant. This
supports the view that inflow of Foreign Aid tends to replace the fiscal capacity of the state.

8. Conclusions
In this paper we examine the role of war in retarding state fiscal capacity in developing
countries, measured by tax revenue ratios to GDP. We build a simple theoretical model of a
factionalized state, where patronage substitutes for common interest public goods, along
with the possibility of violent contestation over a rent or prize, typically in the form of
natural resource revenues. Our dynamic panel empirical analysis on the determinants of
fiscal capacity is applied to 79 developing countries, during 1980-2010. Results indicate
that war, especially in its current dominant form of civil war, retards fiscal capacity, along
with imperfect democracy, political repression, the quality of governance and
macroeconomic mismanagement. High intensity conflict is particularly destructive of state
capacity. Countries experiencing low intensity wars, other institutional factors may matter
more for fiscal capacity formation compared to war. The diminution of state capacity due to
war appears less pronounced after the end of the cold war.
Nations receiving more external development assistance and those countries who rely
more on oil and gas exports have less incentives to develop fiscal (tax) capacity. This
finding has similarities to Ross (2003), who finds a negative impact of oil and gas
abundance on democratic development. Oil and gas endowments can also be a major cause
of outright conflict as our theoretical model suggests. Greater ethnic fractionalization also
retards fiscal capacity, perhaps because of a diminished interest in common interest public
goods as also suggested by our theoretical model.
The findings have important policy implications for a large number of countries that
have faced various forms of civil unrest and armed rebellion. First, measures to reduce
conflict are not only desirable from a humanitarian perspective, they also have positive
effects on economic development. Therefore the prevention and resolution of conflict—
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through democratization, better peace-keeping, and broad-based reconstruction—need
more support from the international community. Second, it follows that revenue-enhancing
reform will have more positive effects when complemented by conflict-reducing measures.
The benefits of reform to the countries themselves will be higher, and the effectiveness of
aid in support of such reform will also be greater. Third, while it is highly desirable to
eliminate conflict entirely—from both humanitarian and economic-development
perspectives—we have shown that there are still substantial gains from the more modest
objective of lowering the level of conflict (from either high intensity to medium intensity, or
from medium intensity to low intensity). This is encouraging given the longstanding and
complex nature of many conflicts in poor countries, and the time and effort which is often
required to achieve complete peace.
We find that civil war does not promote the fiscal capacity of the state in contemporary
developing countries unlike the findings of Charles Tilly for inter-state war in European
history. This may be attributable to the destructive influence of civil war on political and
economic institutions, as well as the possibility that civil war further retards the
development of common interest public goods. Ultimately, however, Charles Tilly may have
got it right---state building remains a quasi-criminal activity; a process which may not
require the development of fiscal capacity as long as alternative avenues of coercive
resources remain open to those who govern.
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Appendix
The sample includes the following 79 countries. The letter ‘c’ within parentheses besides a
country denotes the countries with conflict.
African countries
Algeria (c)
Ghana
Rwanda (c)
Angola (c)
Guinea-Bissau (c)
Senegal (c)
Burkina Faso
Kenya
Sierra Leone (c)
Burundi (c)
Lesotho (c)
Somalia (c)
Cameroon (c)
Liberia (c)
South Africa (c)
Chad (c)
Malawi
Sudan (c)
Congo, Dem. Rep. (c)
Mali (c)
Tanzania
Congo, Rep. of (c)
Morocco
Togo
Côte d’Ivoire
Mozambique (c)
Tunisia (c)
Eritrea (c)
Niger (c)
Uganda (c)
Ethiopia (c)
Nigeria
Zambia
Non-African countries
Argentina
Guatemala (c)
Mexico
Azerbaijan (c)
Haiti (c)
Myanmar (c)
Bangladesh
Honduras
Nepal (c)
Bolivia
India (c)
Nicaragua (c)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (c)
Indonesia (c)
Pakistan (c)
Brazil
Iran (c)
Paraguay
Cambodia (c)
Iraq (c)
Peru (c)
Chile
Israel (c)
Philippines (c)
Colombia (c)
Jamaica
Singapore
Costa Rica
Laos (c)
Sri Lanka (c)
Croatia (c)
Lebanon (c)
Thailand
Dominican Republic
Libya (c)
Uruguay
Ecuador
Macedonia (c)
Venezuela (c)
Egypt (c)
Madagascar
Yemen (c)
El Salvador (c)
Malaysia
Georgia (c)
Maldives
Variables and Data Source:
Observations in the panel dataset used in the study are collected for all 79 countries for
which data were available for the 1980-2010 period. The data is averaged over 5-year
periods in order to generate balanced regression equations. The periods are 1981-1985,
1986-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005, and 2006-2010.
Data Source:
Per capita GDP (constant US dollar, 2000): World Development Indicators
GDP constant US dollar, 2000: World Development Indicators
Trade openness ((import+export)/GDP): World Development Indicators
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Dual Exchange market dummy: Annual report on exchange/arrangements, and exchange
restrictions, IMF
Economic Freedom Indicator: Gwartney, Lawson, and Block (1996) were among the first
to systematically quantify in each country those tangible characteristics reflecting various
aspects of these basic categories of economic freedoms and aggregate them into a single
index of economic freedom, herein referred to as the EFI. Appendix A contains a list from
Gwartney and Lawson (2011) of the specific measures of institutional characteristics that
comprise the EFI. This index has been created for over 120 countries and has been updated
every five years starting in 1975, and then annually starting in 2000. The EFI value for each
country ranges from 1.0 (the least economic freedoms) to 10.0 (the greatest economic
freedoms). Many studies using this index have found empirical support for the argument
that societies adopting institutions that retain higher levels of economic freedoms have
achieved higher levels of economic growth (for a thorough survey, see Berggren, 2003).
The Economic Freedom of the World Index (EFI) was designed by James Gwartney and
Robert Lawson and is published periodically (annually since the year 2000) by the Fraser
Institute. The index ranges from 1 (the least
amount of economic freedom) to 10 (the highest amount of economic freedom). The latest
index was published in 2003 and can be found at: www.freetheworld.com/. Gwartney and
Lawson use empirically observed values from within these seven categories to derive an
index representing a relative measure of economic freedom. The following is an
abbreviated description of the five major components and their respective subcomponents
that are used to derive the EFI.
1. Size of a country’s government (relative to the whole economy):
a. Expenditures as a percentage of total consumption
b. Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP
c. Government enterprises and investment as a percent of total investment
d. Top marginal income tax rate
2. The country’s legal structure (rule of law) and security of property rights:
a. Evidence of judicial independence
b. Evidence of impartial courts
c. Protection of intellectual property
d. Military interference in the rule of law
e. Integrity of the legal system
3. Access to sound money:
a. Average annual growth rate of money supply less average growth rate of GDP
b. Inflation rate
c. Inflation rate variability
d. Freedom to own foreign currency
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4. Freedom to trade internationally:
a. Taxes on international trade
b. Regulatory trade barriers
c. Actual versus expected size of the of trade sector of the economy
d. Difference between official and actual currency exchange rates
e. Extent of international capital market controls
5. Regulation of credit, labor, and business:
a. Credit market regulations: interest rate controls, privatization of banks, etc.
b. Labor market regulations: wage restrictions, hiring/firing restrictions, military
conscription, etc.
c. Business regulations: price controls, licensing restrictions, etc.
The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) has recorded ongoing violent conflicts since the
1970s. The data provided is one of the most accurate and well-used data-sources on global
armed conflicts and its definition of armed conflict is becoming a standard in how conflicts
are systematically defined and studied. Data source: Themnér, Lotta & Peter Wallensteen,
(2011), and updated using data from The Uppsala Conflict Data Program
(UCDP)http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/
Conflict
Low intensity armed conflict: at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and fewer than
1000 battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict.
Medium intensity armed conflict: at least 25 battle related deaths per year and an
accumulated total of at least 1000 deaths, but fewer than 1000 deaths per year.
High intensity armed conflict: at least 1000 battle-related deaths per year.
Political Repression: The Political Terror Scale (PTS) measures levels of political violence
and terror that a country experiences in a particular year based on a 5-level “terror scale”
originally developed by Freedom House. The data used in compiling this index comes from
two different sources: the yearly country reports of Amnesty International and the U.S.
State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.
Political Terror Scale
Level 5: Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place
no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideologoical
goals.
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Level 4: Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the
population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its
generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves
in politics or ideas.
Level 3: There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such
imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common.
Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.
Level 2: There is limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity.
However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is
rare.
Level 1: Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views,
and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.
Source: www.politicalterrorscale.org

Fractionalization:
The Fractionalization dataset was compiled by Alberto Alesina and associates (see Alesina
et al (2003)), and measures the degree of ethnic, linguistic and religious heterogeneity in
various countries. This measure of ethnic fragmentation is a broad classification of groups
taking into account not only language but also racial characteristics (ethnicity) and religion.
The indices are computed as one minus the Herfindahl index of group shares.
http://www.nsd.uib.no/macrodataguide/set.html?id=16&sub=1
Foreign Aid:
Data on the flow of foreign aid is taken from the OECD/DAC database
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/statisticsonresourceflowstodevelopingcountries.htm
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) publishes statistics and reports on aid and
other resource flows to developing countries, based principally on reporting by DAC
Members, multilateral organisations and other donors. The data are collected via two
reporting systems:


The DAC aggregates on aid, other official flows and private flows, including a
breakdown on type of aid extended, geographical distribution, sectoral breakdown
and tying status of aid.
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The Creditor Reporting System (CRS) aid activity database, which contains
detailed quantitative and descriptive data on individual aid projects and
programmes. CRS data are used to analyse the sectoral and geographical
breakdown of aid for selected years and donors, to examine aid that promotes
specific policy objectives (gender equality, environmental sustainability, untying,
aid for trade) and to monitor donors’ compliance with various international
recommendations in the field of development co-operation.

Oil/Gas Exporting countries:
The list of oil and gas exporting countries is taken from the database of the International
Energy Agency (IEA)
http://www.iea.org/
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Table 2
The Tax Revenue (TAX) variable and countries with different conflict intensity (n=51)
Level of Conflict Intensity

Tax Revenue (TAX)

No. of Countries

Low [1]

0.257* (2.66)

11

Medium [2]

0.142* (2.35)

17

High [3]

0.065* (2.02)

23

F-value

10.58*

Note: An asterisk * next to the TAX variable indicates that the average value is significantly
different from the average value shown next below, at the 5 percent level. The figures in
parentheses () show the t-statistics which are all significant at least at the 5 percent level.
An asterisk next to the F-value shows that it exceeds the critical value, which is 3.1 in this
case. Figures in [] next to each level of conflict intensity show the number used to measure
that particular level of intensity in the data set.
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Table 3
Estimation Results
Variable

Cross Section

Fixed Effects

System GMM

Constant

3.66 (2.90)

8.54 (5.33)

12.24 (6.20)

Conflict

-0.08 (0.98)

-1.54 (4.90)

-1.84 (5.63)

Log(GDP PC)

0.11 (1.65)

0.85 (3.26)

0.54 (3.74)

Log(GDP)

0.10 (0.88)

0.46 (2.19)

0.78 (2.94)

Inflation

-1.13 (4.24)

-1.69 (3.77)

-1.20 (4.12)

Dual Ex Rate

3.62 (1.21)

-1.64 (4.20)

-1.33 (4.59)

Trade

0.088 (2.06)

-0.67 (2.69)

-0.49 (3.23)

EFI

1.48 (5.62)

3.72 (6.80)

3.90 (7.42))

-0.18 (2.45)

-0.08 (2.00)

Africa*Conflict

1st order Serial Corr. (p-value)
0.412
nd
2 order Serial Corr. (p-value)
Years Indicator
Yes
Country Fixed Effect
Yes
AR(1) p-value
AR(2) p-value
Hansen test for
Overidentifying restrictions (p-value)
Sargan Test (p-value)
Difference Sargan Test (p-value)
Number of countries
79
79
Number of observations 528
514


0.06
0.43
Yes
Yes
0.014
0.336
14.68 (0.18)
0.26
0.24
79
510

Figures in parentheses after the coefficient estimates are the absolute values of the tstatistics.
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Table 4
Effect of Long-run Impact Multipliers on Tax Revenue (TAX)
Intensity of Conflict
Medium

Low

.

Variables

High

No Conflict

Conflict

1.12

1.19

0.91

------

GDP

0.68

1.40

1.05

1.25

Inflation

0.88

0.90

0.86

0.77

EFI

1.04

1.65

1.20

1.84

Note: The figures represent the percentage change in financial development due to a unit
change in each of the explanatory variables

Table 5
Ranking of Variables in order of long run impact on financial development
High
Conflict
EFI
Inflation
GDP

Intensity of Conflict
Medium
EFI
GDP
Conflict
Inflation

Low

.

EFI
GDP
Conflict
Inflation
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No Conflict
EFI
GDP
Inflation

Table 6
System GMM Estimation Results
Variable

Base Equation

Column 2

Column 3

Constant

12.24 (6.20)

11.16 (5.10)

8.70 (3.62)

Conflict

-1.84 (5.63)

-1.24 (4.12)

----

Log(GDP PC)

0.54 (3.74)

0.19 (2.66)

0.60 (8.32)

Log(GDP)

0.78 (2.94)

1.14 (3.17)

1.32 (6.14)

Inflation

-1.20 (4.12)

-0.66 (2.11)

-0.15 (1.60)

Dual Ex Rate

-1.33 (4.59)

-1.08 (1.99)

-0.78 (3.76)

Trade

-0.49 (3.23)

-1.25 (3.16)

-0.88 (2.94)

EFI
Africa*Conflict

3.90 (7.42))
-0.08 (2.00)

-----0.06 (2.44)

2.78 (6.44)
-0.63 (4.99)

1.60 (3.74)

----2.15 (5.97)

POLITY
Political Repression
1st order Serial Corr. (p-value)
0.06
nd
2 order Serial Corr. (p-value)
0.43
Years Indicator
Yes
Country Fixed Effect
Yes
AR(1) p-value
0.014
AR(2) p-value
0.336
Hansen test for
14.68 (0.18)
Overidentifying restrictions (p-value)
Sargan Test (p-value)
0.26
Difference Sargan Test (p-value)
0.24
Number of countries
79
Number of observations
510


0.10
0.76
Yes
Yes
0.023
0.166
24.10 (0.34)
0.34
0.36
79
510

0.18
0.84
Yes
Yes
0.114
0.186
22.18 (0.30)
0.38
0.24
76
484

Figures in parentheses after the coefficient estimates are the absolute values of the tstatistics.
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Table 7
System GMM Estimation Results
Variable

Base Equation

Column 2

Column 3

Constant

12.24 (6.20)

8.23 (5.11)

9.60 (6.12)

Conflict

-1.84 (5.63)

-1.24 (4.66)

------

Log(GDP PC)

0.54 (3.74)

0.22 (3.88)

0.66 (3.90)

log(GDP)

0.78 (2.94)

1.30 (3.26)

2.11 (5.12)

Inflation

-1.20 (4.12)

-0.88 (3.55)

-1.16 (4.20)

Dual Ex Rate

-1.33 (4.59)

-1.70 (5.90)

-0.86 (4.10)

Trade

-0.49 (3.23)

-1.65 (4.58)

-0.68 (3.24)

EFI
Africa*Conflict

3.90 (7.42)
-0.08 (2.00)

4.77 (8.44)
-0.74 (3.22)

-----1.19 (4.16)

POLITY
Political Repression
President dummy

-------------

-----------0.39 (1.23)

3.12 (6.80)

0.12
0.16
Yes
Yes
0.022
0.241
12.20 (0.16)

0.09
0.17
Yes
Yes
0.018
0.187
10.65 (0.14)

0.18
0.14
79
510

0.18
0.13
76
484

1st order Serial Corr. (p-value)
0.06
2nd order Serial Corr. (p-value)
0.43
Years Indicator
Yes
Country Fixed Effect
Yes
AR(1) p-value
0.014
AR(2) p-value
0.336
Hansen test for
14.68 (0.18)
Overidentifying restrictions (p-value)
Sargan Test (p-value)
0.26
Difference Sargan Test (p-value)
0.24
Number of countries
79
Number of observations
510


-.09 (1.06)

Figures in parentheses after the coefficient estimates are the absolute values of the tstatistics.
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Table 8:

System GMM Estimation: Cold War Period 1980-1990

Variable

Column 1

Column 2

Constant

3.24 (4.14)

4.92 (5.10)

Conflict

-3.68 (4.55)

Log (GDP PC) 0.84 (2.40)

Column 3

Column 4

3.22 (2.90)

4.10 (3.88)

-4.34 (4.80)

------

-------

1.26 (3.13)

1.07 (3.20)

0.98 (2.34)

Log (GDP)

0.36 (2.10)

0.47 (2.48)

0.65 (2.98)

0.32 (2.33)

Inflation

-0.88 (1.98)

-1.18 (2.44)

-1.13 (2.10)

-0.68 (3.00)

Dual Ex Rate -3.80 (4.49)

-3.57 (6.10)

-3.28 (4.87)

-2.10 (4.29)

-0.88 (3.20)

-0.98 (3.11)

Trade

-1.15 (3.77)

EFI

2.48 (7.10)

-0.74 (3.99)
------

1.55 (4.40)

Africa*Conflict -0.26 (3.77)

-0.58 (4.57)

--------

--------

POLITY

1.76 (7.44)

--------

1.30 (3.48)

-----------

--------

Political Repression ----

------

-2.46 (5.55)

-3.87 (7.43)

# of Countries
# of observation

79
235

76
225

76
225

79
235
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Table 9:

System GMM Estimation: Post-Cold War Period 1990-2010

Variable

Column 1

Column 2

Column 3

Constant

2.15 (2.88)

4.14 (3.10)

4.33 (4.16)

Conflict

-1.57 (2.87)

-1.76 (2.63)

Log (GDP PC)

1.18 (4.33)

2.84 (4.19)

Log (GDP)

2.65 (4.88)

Inflation

-----

Column 4
3.77 (4.72)
-----

1.86 (3.20)

2.28 (4.27)

3.10 (5.28)

365 (4.82)

-1.77 (3.86) -0.76 (2.90)

-1.05 (4.66)

-1.00 (3.76)

Dual Ex Rate

-3.24 (5.88) -2.85 (5.77)

-3.19 (5.50)

-2.65 (4.38)

Trade

-1.23 (3.10) -1.65 (3.38)

-1.09 (4.34)

-1.88 (4.98)

EFI

1.38 (2.55)

------

1.09 (2.07)

Africa*Conflict

-1.15 (3.99)

-2.09 (4.38)

-------

-------

POLITY

-----------

2.86 (6.83)

--------

3.22 (7.40)

------

-1.55 (3.88)

-1.38 (2.39)

79
314

76
304

76
304

Political Repression ---# of Countries
# of observation

79
314

4.17 (7.54)
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Table 10:

System GMM Estimation: Intra versus Inter-state conflict

Variable

Intra-state

Inter-state

Constant

1.84 (3.15)

2.20 (3.44)

Conflict

-2.45 (4.18)

-0.36 (2.15)

Log (GDP PC)

0.96 (5.14)

1.14 (5.36)

Log (GDP)

1.11 (3.02)

0.68 (1.98)

Inflation

-0.48 (1.94)

-0.04 (1.47)

Dual Exch Rate

-1.20 (2.36)

-2.44 (2.90)

Trade

-0.15 (1.77)

-0.97 (1.53)

EFI

2.46 (5.80)

1.90 (3.77)

Africa*Conflict

-1.49 (3.60)

-1.74 (2.48)

# of Countries
# of observation

25

42
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Table 11
System GMM Estimation Results: Ethnicity & Oil and Gas Exporter Dummy
Variable

Base Equation

Ethnicity

Ethnicity

Oil/Gas

Oil/Gas

Constant

12.24 (6.20)

6.22 (3.45)

7.15 (3.91)

4.70 (2.56)

3.66 (2.90)

Conflict

-1.84 (5.63)

Log(GDP PC)

0.54 (3.74)

0.45 (2.68)

0.64 (3.14)

0.31 (2.96)

0.70 (3.03)

log(GDP)

0.78 (2.94)

2.44 (5.34)

1.80 (3.96)

1.98 (5.76)

1.04 (3.80)

Inflation

-1.20 (4.12)

-0.65 (2.65)

-1.02 (4.40)

-1.50 (3.70)

-1.94 (3.70)

Dual Ex Rate

-1.33 (4.59)

-0.87 (3.90)

-1.15 (4.16)

-1.12 (4.39)

-1.35 (3.66)

Trade

-0.49 (3.23)

-1.54 (4.10)

-0.63 (3.80)

-0.76 (3.87)

-0.85 (2.38)

EFI

3.90 (7.42)

2.35 (5.54)

2.40 (6.60)

2.75 (6.10)

1.80 (4.33)

Ethnicity
Oil/Gas Dummy
Africa*Conflict
Ethnicity*Conflict
Oil/Gas*Conflict

-----0.08 (2.00)
-----

-0.74 (1.11)
---0.43 (3.72)
0.65 (1.45)
---

-0.82 (2.04)
---0.36 (2.14)
-----

---1.12 (3.46)
-0.64 (3.65)
---0.18 (2.35)

---2.64 (4.15)
-0.49 (3.04)
-----

---

---

1st order Serial Corr.(p-value) 0.06
0.10
2nd order Serial Corr. (p-value)0.43
0.22
Years Indicator
Yes
Yes
Country Fixed Effect
Yes
Yes
AR(1) p-value
0.014
0.009
AR(2) p-value
0.336
0.190
Hansen test for
14.68 (0.18) 13.11 (0.17)
Overidentifying restrictions (p-value)
Sargan Test (p-value)
0.26
0.12
Difference Sargan Test (p-value) 0.24
0.19
Number of countries
79
79
Number of observations
510
510


---

---

0.04
0.18
Yes
Yes
0.008
0.236
12.84 (.12)

0.10
0.07
0.27
0.34
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.011
0.017
0.202
0.226
9.35 (0.11) 11.14 (0.13)

0.17
0.20
79
510

0.12
0.22
76
480

0.17
0.22
76
480

Figures in parentheses after the coefficient estimates are the absolute values of the t-statistics.
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Table 12
System GMM Estimation Results: Foreign Aid
Variable

Base Equation

Foreign Aid

Constant

12.24 (6.20)

7.88 (4.14)

Conflict

-1.84 (5.63)

-1.16 (3.84)

Log(GDP PC)

0.54 (3.74)

0.71 (3.18)

log(GDP)

0.78 (2.94)

1.53 (3.17)

Inflation

-1.20 (4.12)

-0.92 (3.36)

Dual Ex Rate

-1.33 (4.59)

-1.94 (5.22)

Trade

-0.49 (3.23)

-0.46 (3.14)

EFI

3.90 (7.42)

2.14 (6.36)

Africa*Conflict

-0.08 (2.00)

-0.36 (2.37)

Foreign Aid

---

-1.99 (4.15)

1st order Serial Corr. (p-value)
0.06
2nd order Serial Corr. (p-value)
0.43
Years Indicator
Yes
Country Fixed Effect
Yes
AR(1) p-value
0.014
AR(2) p-value
0.336
Hansen test for
14.68 (0.18)
Overidentifying restrictions (p-value)
Sargan Test (p-value)
0.26
Difference Sargan Test (p-value)
0.24
Number of countries
79
Number of observations
510


0.09
0.36
Yes
Yes
0.011
0.288
12.18 (0.17)
0.19
0.21
79
510

Figures in parentheses after the coefficient estimates are the absolute values of the tstatistics.
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